Recently our political discourse here in the US has been replete with references to Class Warfare, so I wanted to devote this blog post - and perhaps continue this topic with ongoing comments - to addressing the meaning of the phrase, where it comes from, and what its implications might be for us today.
Of course the concept of class warfare is a fundamental piece of the Marxist/Communist lexicon, which, like much of the language that emerged from socialist and even social democratic theories and political action in the 19th and early 20th centuries became anathema to American politics during the later cold war era and into the 21st century.
In Marx's original formulation, though, class warfare was not necessarily analogous to conventional warfare in any real way, but rather class warfare was a perennial state of conflict that existed. Marx's social observations and his perceptions of the course humanity would follow were predicated on this fundamental historical analysis. According to Marx all of human history and social interaction could and should be understood within the context of class conflict. He argued that all history is the history of class conflict and that relationships between nations and peoples and individuals must be understood through that lens. Class warfare, in Marx's view, was not something that one created or precipitated, but rather something that always exists, whether we are cognizant of it or not. The creation of class consciousness and the subsequent uprising of the Proletariat (or the broader working class) would be a physical manifestation of class warfare, but even without any direct physical engagement (or I would argue economic or political engagement) that battle had already been joined.
Of course Marx argued that this uprising and the Revolution that would ensue was a historical inevitability that would emerge in western industrialized capitalist states, where the combination of income/wealth gap and urban class consciousness (education) would generate an environment conducive to more visible class conflict.
But as much as Marx was a keen historical and social analyst, his predictions were clearly inaccurate. The social revolution guided by Marxist doctrine did ultimately come, but not to the modernized West, but rather in the economically and socially less developed East in the form of the Bolshevik revolution and the creation of the Soviet Union, whose communist experiment lasted just over 70 years.
Why did Marx get it wrong and what can we learn from that history that might help us understand today's world? I would argue that what Marx had not counted on was the impact of Marxism itself (and related political/ideological movements). In other words, Marx contended that the course he observed of continuing wealth disparity and political disenfranchisement would continue unchecked, and that the industrial west would even further accelerate those divisions. But I would make a case that the presence of trade unions, Marxist organizations, socialist political parties, and other locally, nationally, or even internationally based entities, and the very threat of revolution, compelled those in authority to open up avenues in both the political and economic realms, and even develop innovative social policies, to reduce disparities in wealth and income, bring the working class into the political process rather than outside of it, and thereby put off the prospect of revolution and its accompanying political/social/economic upheaval. In other words, the very embrace of some elements of the welfare state, to a greater of lesser extent in the various countries of the West, created a factor for which Marx had not encountered - allowing for a two way street in which those who were inclined towards Marxism in western societies generally worked within the democratic political processes through Socialist, Social Democratic, and other liberally inclined political parties and by the same token those societies generally incorporated elements of these groups demands thus reducing the likelihood of revolution.
The lesson from history, as I see it, is that we reject the political and economic trappings of the welfare state at our own peril (as embodied by the New Deal and Great Society programs in the United States). Perhaps Marx was right and class warfare already exists - the question we need to ask is whether we want that struggle manifest through gradual or revolutionary means.
Tuesday, September 27, 2011
Tuesday, September 20, 2011
The Emancipation Proclamation and Southern Secession: what to make of unilateral declarations
Occasionally on this blog I will take a look at what has transpired close to this particular date in years past as a lens for examining the present, and one of the items that comes up on "this week in history" is the preliminary issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation by President Lincoln in 1862 (officially promulgated on January 1, 1863), while the country was very much in the thick of the Civil War. Of course Lincoln had hoped, so the story goes, to avoid conflict and to negotiate terms with the Southern states in ways that would prevent Secession (such as a gradual abolition of slavery) but as often happens ideology trumped pragmatism and South Carolina and other states asserted their rights as supposedly sovereign independent entities to sever their ties with what they viewed as an oppressive regime in Washington. The ensuing Civil War of course provides the context for the Emancipation Proclamation - in its own way a unilateral declaration.
While the Proclamation is not to be lightly dismissed as sheer politicking, the student of history is cautioned to understand what exactly the proclamation entailed, and then to determine what we can take away from that seemingly auspicious moment. Remember that Lincoln called for the abolition of slavery as an institution - and therefore the liberation of all those held in servitude - within the states that were then in rebellion against the United States of America. Noting this fact of course leads to 2 important points of clarification:
1. The slaves in the so-called border states that were still loyal to the Union were not emancipated - as these states were not in rebellion against the US government the Emancipation Proclamation was not applicable to them. Technically that only occurred in 1865.
2. At the time the U.S. did not actually exercise sovereignty over those states and territories which were in rebellion against the country, and so in practical terms the proclamation could have only limited impact on the lives of slaves, or anyone in the south for that matter. Again it was Lee's surrender at Appomattox which allowed for emancipation in the South.
Yet we still hold out the Emancipation Proclamation as a momentous event, and indeed there is some logic to that conclusion. Words and ideas have import and sometimes one might argue power, even if those who write or speak those words have little chance of directly and immediately implementing those sentiments. The language Lincoln employed appealed to those who favored abolition and demonstrated a commitment to ideals expressed in the Declaration of Independence, even as he practically had no authority to liberate slaves in the South and did not apply the proclamation to the border states that were still under Union control. But clearly the words sent a message to people in the border states - as if the Civil War itself did not - that the days of legalized slavery in the United States were numbered, and expressly stated what many already knew, that the war was not merely over issues of states' rights and the limits of federal authority, but that indeed human slavery was central to the conflict between North and South.
Yet ultimately the ability to take those ideas declared so publicly and implement them on the ground depended on the Union army's successful operations on the battlefield. And to some extent even that was not enough as the ongoing presence of Union troops during Reconstruction was essential to providing some degree of freedom and liberty for the freed slaves, much of which vanished after 1877.
From the perspective of most Southerners at that time, the words that represented their cause were those which essentially formed the Confederacy's own unilateral declaration of principles - as they perceived their cause as justly embodying self-determination for their own people (not counting slaves as people of course). Had they emerged from the conflict victorious they would have viewed the outcome as a clarion call for freedom (as they defined it) from the tyranny of Federal oppression. Certainly in the aftermath of Appomattox and the ensuing era of Reconstruction, countless honorable freedom-loving southerners viewed the presence of Blue-clad troops, not to mention carpet-bagging profiteers, as representative of a foreign and unwanted occupying force, with no legitimate claim other than a notion of constitutional authority which was not shared by the indigenous population.
Regarding each of these unilateral declarations - Secession and Emancipation - perhaps the lesson to be drawn bares little profundity but rather reflects the age old principle of power. Sometimes having a seemingly just cause and clearly constructed ideals is not enough, as powerful forces, be they broad historical trends or a well armed opponent, can obscure and obstruct the path to realizing such goals. In this example might made right and ultimately enabled posterity to embrace the morality of Emancipation over the defiance of Secession. Had the Battle of Gettysburg ended differently, subsequent generations might have a different perspective on the unilateral declarations of Emancipation and Secession.
While the Proclamation is not to be lightly dismissed as sheer politicking, the student of history is cautioned to understand what exactly the proclamation entailed, and then to determine what we can take away from that seemingly auspicious moment. Remember that Lincoln called for the abolition of slavery as an institution - and therefore the liberation of all those held in servitude - within the states that were then in rebellion against the United States of America. Noting this fact of course leads to 2 important points of clarification:
1. The slaves in the so-called border states that were still loyal to the Union were not emancipated - as these states were not in rebellion against the US government the Emancipation Proclamation was not applicable to them. Technically that only occurred in 1865.
2. At the time the U.S. did not actually exercise sovereignty over those states and territories which were in rebellion against the country, and so in practical terms the proclamation could have only limited impact on the lives of slaves, or anyone in the south for that matter. Again it was Lee's surrender at Appomattox which allowed for emancipation in the South.
Yet we still hold out the Emancipation Proclamation as a momentous event, and indeed there is some logic to that conclusion. Words and ideas have import and sometimes one might argue power, even if those who write or speak those words have little chance of directly and immediately implementing those sentiments. The language Lincoln employed appealed to those who favored abolition and demonstrated a commitment to ideals expressed in the Declaration of Independence, even as he practically had no authority to liberate slaves in the South and did not apply the proclamation to the border states that were still under Union control. But clearly the words sent a message to people in the border states - as if the Civil War itself did not - that the days of legalized slavery in the United States were numbered, and expressly stated what many already knew, that the war was not merely over issues of states' rights and the limits of federal authority, but that indeed human slavery was central to the conflict between North and South.
Yet ultimately the ability to take those ideas declared so publicly and implement them on the ground depended on the Union army's successful operations on the battlefield. And to some extent even that was not enough as the ongoing presence of Union troops during Reconstruction was essential to providing some degree of freedom and liberty for the freed slaves, much of which vanished after 1877.
From the perspective of most Southerners at that time, the words that represented their cause were those which essentially formed the Confederacy's own unilateral declaration of principles - as they perceived their cause as justly embodying self-determination for their own people (not counting slaves as people of course). Had they emerged from the conflict victorious they would have viewed the outcome as a clarion call for freedom (as they defined it) from the tyranny of Federal oppression. Certainly in the aftermath of Appomattox and the ensuing era of Reconstruction, countless honorable freedom-loving southerners viewed the presence of Blue-clad troops, not to mention carpet-bagging profiteers, as representative of a foreign and unwanted occupying force, with no legitimate claim other than a notion of constitutional authority which was not shared by the indigenous population.
Regarding each of these unilateral declarations - Secession and Emancipation - perhaps the lesson to be drawn bares little profundity but rather reflects the age old principle of power. Sometimes having a seemingly just cause and clearly constructed ideals is not enough, as powerful forces, be they broad historical trends or a well armed opponent, can obscure and obstruct the path to realizing such goals. In this example might made right and ultimately enabled posterity to embrace the morality of Emancipation over the defiance of Secession. Had the Battle of Gettysburg ended differently, subsequent generations might have a different perspective on the unilateral declarations of Emancipation and Secession.
Tuesday, September 13, 2011
Reflections on 9/11 and clash of civilizations
As any historian will tell you ten years is hardly enough time to reach any sort of historical analysis - certainly in the realms of sociology and political science, perhaps even theology, significant conclusions emerge, but the true historical impact of September 11, 2001 will be elusive for quite some time. I would argue that we will need to wait at least a full generation if not longer to understand how the initial attack as well as ensuing events fit into the broader ever-changing picture of world history. So too with respect the events of ten years ago had on shaping the outlook of a generation raised in its shadow. It is easy to say refer to today's youth as the 9/11 generation, especially in light of all of the public attention given to commemorating the date ten years on, but I seriously question the extent to which that tragedy, compared to other changes in American society, impact the world outlook and social/political ideologies of those who have lived in the aftermath.
In hindsight it may be that 9/11 represents an early period of a broader historical era in which we find ourselves, in which the (predominantly) Christian West confronts Muslim civilization on a scale unknown since the days of the Crusades - with an important difference between now and the conflict of a thousand years ago.
In the Crusader era the nature of the war, while in some ways bound up in conventional geopolitical terms of land and power, was consistently and accurately framed in religious terms. Indeed the catchphrase for the Christian forces was a Crusade to liberate the holy land from infidels (in this case Moslems). For its part the forces of Islam were at their height of expansionism aggressively and undeniably seeking to bring greater numbers of people and lands under the authority of the Moslem Caliphate. Arguably both sides shared a common religious outlook of spreading religious truth, as they knew it, at the point of the sword. From a historical perspective for the Christian west this period represented the heart of the so-called dark ages, centuries prior to the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment which would characterize Western modernity. Conversely, for the Moslem world, the Crusades came at a point of widespread geopolitical expansion and maximal intellectual and cultural creativity, soon to be overshadowed by the changes that emerged from European society.
The East vs. West conflicts embodied by the 9/11 attacks, but clearly characteristic of a broader period of time that started decades ago and will continue into the future, do not offer the clear parallel structures of the Crusader era, simply presented as Christianity vs. Islam. The west, while still arguably Christian in its cultural orientation, hardly operates from the basis of theological fealty and Missionary activity - perhaps the ultimate embodiment of western European civilization are those northern European states which have gone farthest in eliminating the role of religion in the political and legislative processes. The United States, which hardly is extreme in its removal of religion as a factor in public life, is arguably representative of this challenge by its use of military and economic prowess to expand a culture of modernity. The Moslem world, on the other hand, for the most part, has not embraced the ideological underpinnings of modern society in the political and social spheres, and certainly those individuals and groups most aggressively confronting the West explicitly call for social and political structures more akin to what we might call a pre-modern era.
Perhaps the lesson from history in this case is that even though the situations are not entirely analogous because we do not see ourselves engaged in religious conflict, viewing today's East vs. West battles in religious terms may be useful - at least in so far as wars of religion, while indeed about power, are also conflicts of ideology - and thus empower the combatants to fight for causes not limited to conventional models of land and sovereignty. While history demonstrates that states and their armies can be easily defeated, wars of ideas often take longer to conclude, and often turn more on the ability to defeat the idea with more powerful ideas, rather than with swords and bullets.
In hindsight it may be that 9/11 represents an early period of a broader historical era in which we find ourselves, in which the (predominantly) Christian West confronts Muslim civilization on a scale unknown since the days of the Crusades - with an important difference between now and the conflict of a thousand years ago.
In the Crusader era the nature of the war, while in some ways bound up in conventional geopolitical terms of land and power, was consistently and accurately framed in religious terms. Indeed the catchphrase for the Christian forces was a Crusade to liberate the holy land from infidels (in this case Moslems). For its part the forces of Islam were at their height of expansionism aggressively and undeniably seeking to bring greater numbers of people and lands under the authority of the Moslem Caliphate. Arguably both sides shared a common religious outlook of spreading religious truth, as they knew it, at the point of the sword. From a historical perspective for the Christian west this period represented the heart of the so-called dark ages, centuries prior to the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment which would characterize Western modernity. Conversely, for the Moslem world, the Crusades came at a point of widespread geopolitical expansion and maximal intellectual and cultural creativity, soon to be overshadowed by the changes that emerged from European society.
The East vs. West conflicts embodied by the 9/11 attacks, but clearly characteristic of a broader period of time that started decades ago and will continue into the future, do not offer the clear parallel structures of the Crusader era, simply presented as Christianity vs. Islam. The west, while still arguably Christian in its cultural orientation, hardly operates from the basis of theological fealty and Missionary activity - perhaps the ultimate embodiment of western European civilization are those northern European states which have gone farthest in eliminating the role of religion in the political and legislative processes. The United States, which hardly is extreme in its removal of religion as a factor in public life, is arguably representative of this challenge by its use of military and economic prowess to expand a culture of modernity. The Moslem world, on the other hand, for the most part, has not embraced the ideological underpinnings of modern society in the political and social spheres, and certainly those individuals and groups most aggressively confronting the West explicitly call for social and political structures more akin to what we might call a pre-modern era.
Perhaps the lesson from history in this case is that even though the situations are not entirely analogous because we do not see ourselves engaged in religious conflict, viewing today's East vs. West battles in religious terms may be useful - at least in so far as wars of religion, while indeed about power, are also conflicts of ideology - and thus empower the combatants to fight for causes not limited to conventional models of land and sovereignty. While history demonstrates that states and their armies can be easily defeated, wars of ideas often take longer to conclude, and often turn more on the ability to defeat the idea with more powerful ideas, rather than with swords and bullets.
Thursday, September 8, 2011
America at War
As we approach the 10th anniversary of the September 11th attacks we are inundated with "news" reports reflecting on the past decade and how much are American society has changed as a result of that fateful morning. One element of our changed environment that often receives attention is the notion that America has been at war for the last ten years - whether in some undefined "war on terror" or engaged in actual combat on the ground in the Middle East. Indeed American troops have been engaged in Afghanistan for nearly the entire 10 year period, representing the longest declared military engagement in United States history. Experts and others of course continue to debate the prognoses regarding the ultimate outcome of this conflict, as to whether victory is even attainable and what might be the most effective strategy for achieving that goal. No doubt one of the political forces that has compelled continued presence in both Afghanistan and Iraq is the reluctance or even refusal to consider, much less admit, the possibility of defeat - America does not lose wars, so goes the general sentiment (with a caveat regarding what the outcome was in Vietnam).
And I believe there is a large measure of truth to the notion that America does not lose wars - but that statement only has meaning if we have consensus regarding what exactly constitutes a war, as opposed to other forms of conflict, and if that terminology is then consistently applied.
As someone who came of age during the 1980s I cannot say that I experienced America during a time of war, and I believe that to still be the case, notwithstanding the fact that our country does have troops deployed around the globe, and quite often these soldiers are engaging enemy combatants on a daily basis - so how can I say that America is not currently at war?
The simple answer is that I don't see the impact on our daily lives on the homefront. Look at the following measures and compare them to previous generations of Americans' experiences during wartime:
Can America realistically expect a successful outcome to a conflict against an enemy willing to commit its human and material resources for its cause if we are not positioned to do the same. In other words, if we are not willing to engage in "total war" then shouldn't we be asking if its worth fighting for? And if it is worth fighting for, then shouldn't we all share in the risk and sacrifice necessary to secure victory?
The lesson from history is clear that America does achieve victory in war when the country as a whole stands behind the cause - and commits its resources and general will to success.
And I believe there is a large measure of truth to the notion that America does not lose wars - but that statement only has meaning if we have consensus regarding what exactly constitutes a war, as opposed to other forms of conflict, and if that terminology is then consistently applied.
As someone who came of age during the 1980s I cannot say that I experienced America during a time of war, and I believe that to still be the case, notwithstanding the fact that our country does have troops deployed around the globe, and quite often these soldiers are engaging enemy combatants on a daily basis - so how can I say that America is not currently at war?
The simple answer is that I don't see the impact on our daily lives on the homefront. Look at the following measures and compare them to previous generations of Americans' experiences during wartime:
- Conscription - whether or not a volunteer army is more effective in combat than those who have been drafted for military service is clearly a point to be made. But there is little doubt that the impact of subjecting the broad American public to the reality of selective service, and the implications of that service, brings the reality of war to the doorstep of nearly every American family. Today's military hardly represents a cross section of American society.
- Financial Sacrifice - what have American families been asked to sacrifice - in terms of their day to day needs, or even luxury items, to support the war effort? Do we see rationing or scarcity of any specific goods that can demonstrate on a practical level the toll that war is taking on our country?
- Personal investment - Have our citizens even been asked to contribute financially (other than continued federal spending) to the success of the war effort? In an era where most of our debt financing comes from abroad, do we not even consider asking our own citizens to loan the dollars necessary for insuring our security?
Can America realistically expect a successful outcome to a conflict against an enemy willing to commit its human and material resources for its cause if we are not positioned to do the same. In other words, if we are not willing to engage in "total war" then shouldn't we be asking if its worth fighting for? And if it is worth fighting for, then shouldn't we all share in the risk and sacrifice necessary to secure victory?
The lesson from history is clear that America does achieve victory in war when the country as a whole stands behind the cause - and commits its resources and general will to success.
Why a history blog?
A perrenial question - not necessarily novel - but constantly worthy of our consideration:
"If we study history to learn from the mistakes of the past, why are we constantly repeating the mistakes of the past?" Notwithstanding the fact that we study history for many reasons, the question remains poignant.
I introduce this blog as a means of using history precisely for that purpose - to reflect on events in today's world through the lens of the past. Are we constantly following in the same tragic footsteps as our ancestors? And is that really why we study the events of the past?
I invite you to comment, critique, speculate, and otherwise join me in this endeavor with an eye ultimately towards our collective edification on the presumption that there is great value in learning for its own sake, even if we are destined to repeat the errors of previous generations.
"If we study history to learn from the mistakes of the past, why are we constantly repeating the mistakes of the past?" Notwithstanding the fact that we study history for many reasons, the question remains poignant.
I introduce this blog as a means of using history precisely for that purpose - to reflect on events in today's world through the lens of the past. Are we constantly following in the same tragic footsteps as our ancestors? And is that really why we study the events of the past?
I invite you to comment, critique, speculate, and otherwise join me in this endeavor with an eye ultimately towards our collective edification on the presumption that there is great value in learning for its own sake, even if we are destined to repeat the errors of previous generations.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)